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Abstract
We consider fuzzy, or continuous, bits, which take values in [0; 1] and (−1; 1] instead of
{0; 1}, and operations on them (NOT, XOR etc.) and on their sequences (ADD), to obtain
the generalization of cryptographic hash functions, CHFs, for the messages consisting of fuzzy
bits, so that CHFs become smooth and non-constant functions of each bit of the message.
We then train the neural networks to predict the message that has a given hash, where the
loss function for the hash of predicted message and given true hash is backpropagatable. The
results of the trainings for the standard CHFs — MD5, SHA1, SHA2-256, and SHA3/Keccak
— with small number of (optionally weakened) rounds are presented and compared.
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Introduction
Mermaids are boring to fishes from below and to humans from above...
One of the main requirements for a cryptographic hash function (CHF) is the preimage re-
sistance ([16, 5.1]): for the known message/bit string M = (m1; ...;mr) it is “easy” to calculate
the hash H = h(M) = (h1; ...;hk), but for the known H and the unknown M it is “hard” to
obtain any M ′ = (m′1; ...;m
′
s) such that h(M
′) = h(M). In other words, the calculation of the
inverse function h−1(H) (that is, to find any element from the preimage of H with respect to h)
requires, in average, “too much” computation, even though h is not injective for s > k. The worst
case is when only the exhaustive search guarantees the obtaining of M ′, which takes time being
proportional on the average to 2k (if not applying quantum computers, [3]).
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In due course many methods, or attacks, were proposed and developed to reduce the average
time needed to invert the specific CHF: see [29] for MD5, [6] for SHA1, [2] for SHA2, [23] for
SHA3/Keccak. These attacks usually come after “easier” collision attacks (see [22], [30], [31],
[33]), which require in average 2k/2 attempts in the worst case. From the practical side, for
instance, there are widely used SAT(isfiability) solvers ([7], [10], [23], [24]). These approaches
work with discrete, binary as a rule, variables, they search for the combinations of these variables
that satisfy certain equations using various techniques to speed up the search.
(Artificial) neural networks (NNs) on their own are generally considered to be ineffective, —
or, to put it stronger, absolutely useless, — for CHF inversion due to discreteness of the arguments
and the values of CHFs, as well as of inverse CHFs. See e.g. [37], [38], [44]. Here’s why:
Let the input of NN be H = h(M), and we try to train NN to predict M ′ such that h(M ′) = H
(M ′ = M isn’t necessary). For the predicted message M ′ we calculate H ′ = h(M ′) and compare
it with H, obtaining the value of the loss function, which generally decreases when H ′ “becomes
closer” to H, and increases otherwise. For the learning/optimization algorithms, based on gradient
descent (GD) and back propagation (BP) ([11, 4.3, 5.9, 6.5], [28]), to work, the loss function must
satisfy certain properties; in particular, it has to be smooth enough and non-constant (though
some special, less restrictive types of the optimization and GD have been developed).
Clearly, if we use CHFs defined as they are for bit strings, the outputs of (the last layer of)
NN should be discretized to 0 or 1 before we can calculate the CHF of predicted message; here
we cannot treat the outputs as probabilities like we do for classification or pattern recognition
problems. Regardless of how we perform the discretization, the loss function will be piecewise-
constant and non-continuous, because both hashes are discrete then. Even if we replace it with
piecewise-linear one, or something smoother, the dependency of the loss on the weights will be
greatly reduced. However many samples we take and average on them, the loss remains discrete,
hence the small change of any weight either leaves it the same, or makes it leap.
Now, if we extend the definition of CHF to the bits from the whole [0; 1], so that it becomes
smooth, non-constant, and more dependable on each bit of the message, then these obstacles to
GD and BP will be removed. Of course, other issues appear, — local minima; rounding errors
of the floating point arithmetic; NN may learn to predict “essentially fuzzy” messages for given
usual hashes, such messages when rounded to usual bits change hashes, — but at least NN will
be able to learn. And if the learning were “successful”, then trained NN, perhaps with assistance
of other methods, would invert the CHF without trying a lot of combinations of binary variables.
Such bits are the well-known generalization of usual ones, they are called fuzzy and are the basis
of fuzzy logic (see e.g. [13], [17, III], [35]). However, we do not need to keep all “logical” properties,
because they may “stick” us to the extension that is not suitable for our task. Moreover, we can
extend the bit domain even further, from [0; 1] to (−1; 1].
Although we do not rely on logical or probabilistic interpretation of the bit value, cf. [9, XII].
Perhaps here it would be better to call such bits continuous (see [8, 3.2]).
The task for NN then is rather an approximation than a pattern recognition. To be precise,
we can train NN in two different ways, to be either
a) general inverter : at the training NN is presented with hashes of many random messages.
After the training NN should be able to invert arbitrary hash, not only those it saw at the training
(at least partially). Here NN becomes the approximator of the whole inverse CHF; or
b) single inverter : at the training phase we repeatedly input the one and the same hash into
NN, which attempts to predict the message whose hash is as “close” to the input as possible.
When the training is finished, NN should invert only this hash (again, partially). Here NN is the
optimizer of the “distance” between the hash of its output and the fixed input hash. In principle,
such NN doesn’t have to be a “network” and may consist of the output layer only (however, we
found that letting such NN know the input hash seems to improve the accuracy of inversion).
(a) is more universal, (b) is simpler.
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Disclaimer. Because of the small, if any, accuracy of such inversion for a substantial number
of CHFs’ rounds and message length, as shown in the Results, we do not consider it to be an
“attack” or to have any practical cryptanalytic value (e.g. it does not at all help to mine cryp-
tocurrencies), at least on its own. There may exist theorems, unknown to us, proving that under
certain conditions NNs cannot invert better/faster than discrete methods. Rather it is the analysis
of inverse CHFs from the approximation by composition of elementary functions point of view, or
perhaps a mere “proof-of-concept” to make the aforementioned absolute uselessness doubtful.
We suppose that similar investigations were done before, in multiple places, probably some of
their outcomes were not published due to various reasons. We were able to find the researches on
resemblant themes, gathered under Neural Crypto-graphy/-analysis name, the closest ones being
the CryptoNet from [8, 3.2] and the descriptions from [9, XII] (presumably, there are others we’ll
be glad to know about). Many works are dedicated to the construction of CHF on the basis of NN,
when the NN input is a message, and the output is a hash, among the others see [12, 7], [21], [32];
such CHFs are cryptanalyzed e.g. in [26]; in [1] NNs assist in known-plaintext attack on DES; in
[15] the key exchange protocol is proposed, and analyzed in [19], based on synchronization of 2
NNs; in [34] NNs are used in conjunction with homomorphic encryption. See also [20], [27], [36].
1 Bits, hashes, and neural networks
1.1 Fuzzy bits and operations
While the definition of the fuzzy, or continuous, bit here is standard, as in [13, 1.1], [17, III.31],
Usual, binary bit (binbit): b = 0, 1 Fuzzy bit (fuzbit): b ∈ [0; 1]
the ops on such bits can be generalized in many ways, accordingly to the properties we try to
keep. Even when the goal is to build a “natural fuzzy logic” (which we do not aim at), it can be
done differently; see [13, 2]. We describe some of these generalizations below and select one for
each op. Fuzzy ops are denoted in the same way as the usual ones.
There are 4 basic ops: NOT, AND, OR, XOR. We define each of them for a pair of bits, then extend
to the bit strings of equal length bitwisely: if the op on bits a and b is a ∗ b, then (a1; ...; an) ∗
(b1; ...; bn) := (a1 ∗ b1; ...; an ∗ bn).
1) Consistency: for binbits the result of the fuzzy op will be equal to that of the usual op (then
any composition of the fuzzy ops has this property too):
a NOT(a)
0 1
1 0
a b a AND b
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
a b a OR b
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 1
a b a XOR b
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
2) Domain: for fuzbits the result will stay in [0; 1].
3) Feedback: the ops must be smooth enough w.r.t. the operands, and they must not block
the back propagation.
Some, but not all, algebraic and “logical” properties will remain (see below). We cannot say
for sure if keeping or losing certain property of this kind, or a subset of properties, makes NN
training easier or harder. Also, for binbits all these properties are kept due to 1st requirement.
NOT. NOT(a) := 1− a
is less ambiguous than other ops, though alternatives exist: NOT1(a) = (1−a)2, NOT2(a) = cos(pi2 a).
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AND. a AND b := ab
called product t-norm. Alternatives are a AND1 b = min{a, b} (the “traditional” one, as e.g. in
[17]), a AND2 b = (ab)
p etc. See also [13, Ex. 2.1.2]. It may be non-commutative: a AND3 b = a
2b.
OR. a OR b := a+ b− ab.
It’s associative, and De Morgan’s laws hold:
NOT(a OR b) = 1− a− b+ ab = (1− a)(1− b) = NOT(a) AND NOT(b),
NOT(a AND b) = 1− ab = (1− a) + (1− b)− (1− a)(1− b) = NOT(a) OR NOT(b)
Alternatives: a OR1 b = max{a, b}, a OR2 b = a+ b−min{a, b}, a OR3 b = min{a+ b, 1}.
XOR. a XOR b := a(1− b) + (1− a)b.
It’s associative, however aXOR b 6= [([NOT(a)]AND b)OR (aANDNOT(b)])] (that would be provided
by non-associative a XOR1 b = a(1 − b) + b(1 − a) − ab(1 − a)(1 − b)). Again, the absence of this
property doesn’t significantly affect the training results.
Alternatives: a XOR2 b = |a− b|p, a XOR3 b = min{a+ b, 2− a− b}, a XOR4 b = sin(pi2 (a+ b)).
a XOR5 b = (a + b) (mod 2), where x (mod y) = x − ybxy c for x > 0, y > 0, although being
more natural in some sense, doesn’t satisfy 2nd requirement.
ADD. The addition (to be precise, the addition modulo 2n) is special: when applied to two
bit strings of equal length, it is not reduced to bitwise version like the previous ops, due to carry
propagation. This propagation contributes to diffusion, which is an important component of CHF.
Let A = (a1; ...; an) and B = (b1; ...; bn) (“little-endian”: the lower bits have lesser indices).
We obtain the bits of the result S = (s1; ...; sn) = A ADD B one by one, starting from s1 and
calculating the digit si = D(ai; bi; ci−1) and the carry ci = C(ai; bi; ci−1), where c0 = 0.
For binbits we have
ai bi ci−1 D C
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1
In usual logical ops: D = ai XOR bi XOR ci−1, C = (ai AND bi) OR
(
(ai XOR bi) AND ci−1
)
.
We use the same expression to define D (since our XOR is associative, it doesn’t matter if we
take (ai XOR bi) XOR ci−1 or ai XOR (bi XOR ci−1); in general case we would have to choose), but
represent C from the identity ai + bi + ci−1 = D + 2C, implying C = 12 (ai + bi + ci−1 −D).
Thus defined ADD is commutative, but not associative (except for the 1st bit) on fuzbit strings.
Alternatives (a = ai, b = bi, c = ci−1):
D1 = (a XOR b) XOR c, C1 = (a AND b) [X]OR
(
(a XOR b) AND c
)
— “full fuzzy adder”
D2 =
1
2
(
1.0− cos[pi(a+ b+ c)]), C2 = 12 (a+ b+ c−D2)
C3 = min{max{a+ b+ c− 1, 0}, 1}, D3 = a+ b+ c− 2C3
Interpolation. Our fuzzy bitwise ops correspond with the following well-known interpolation
of the function f : [0; 1]2 7→ R inside the [0; 1]2 square, based on its values at corners:
f(x; y) = (1− y)[(1− x)f(0; 0) + xf(1; 0)]+ y[(1− x)f(0; 1) + xf(1; 1)]
For D and C we use such interpolation inside the [0; 1]3 cube.
Modular arithmetic on circle. Another way to fuzzy some ops relies on the domain (−1; 1],
viewed as scaled angles of the point on unit circle: a ∈ (−1; 1] maps to (cos(pia); sin(pia)) ∈ R2 or
to z = eipia = cos(pia) + i sin(pia) ∈ C. Then, for instance, we define (cf. [8, 3.2])
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NOT(a) := 1pi ATANXY
(
cospi(a+ 1); sinpi(a+ 1)
)
=
{
a− 1, a > 0,
a+ 1, a 6 0
AND(a, b) := ab
OR(a, b) := NOT
(
NOT(a) AND NOT(b)
)
XOR(a, b) := 1pi ATANXY
(
cospi(a+ b); sinpi(a+ b)
)
=

a+ b− 2, a+ b > 1,
a+ b, a+ b ∈ (−1; 1],
a+ b+ 2, a+ b 6 −1
ADD: D := ai XOR bi XOR ci−1, C := (ai AND bi) XOR
(
(ai XOR bi) AND ci−1
)
where ATANXY(x, y) for x2 + y2 = 1 is the angle ϕ ∈ (−pi;pi] such that cosϕ = x and sinϕ = y.
In particular, thus defined XOR has more “modular linearity” than the interpolation-based one.
The distance between two such fuzbits is angular ρ(a, b) = min{|a− b|, |a− b+2|, |b−a+2|} or
Euclidean distance between corresponding points on unit circle. At the end of calculations circular
fuzbits can be mapped to “standard” fuzbits, a 7→ |a|, — note that this mapping provides another
“distance”, ρ(a, b) =
∣∣|a| − |b|∣∣, — and then to binbits, by rounding |a|.
We use circular fuzbits and ops, up to NN training, only for SHA3/Keccak (in addition to
“standard” fuzbits for it). For other CHFs with ADD op, and for Keccak with long enough
messages, they sometimes impede learning: NN learns to predict an “essentially fuzzy” message
whose bits are far from 0/1 and thus cannot be rounded to get binbit string with the same hash.
On the other hand, we could add a penalty for the output fuzbits of NN being far from binbits.
1.2 Fuzzy hashes
which might be called “hashes of fuzbit strings”, because the term “fuzzy hash” has certain
established meaning already, and it’s different from ours; cf. [25], [43].
The approach is simply this: take the algorithm to calculate CHF and consider all ops on bits
and bit strings as fuzzy. To be precise, we fuzzy only the “change bits” ops and keep untouched
the “move bits” ops like left shift SHL/, right rotation ROR/≫, or any other fixed permutation
of bits. In particular, LEBE reverses byte order, switching between little- and big-endian.
Message length in bits is a usual number, hence the padding is done with binbits.
The algorithms are described in many places, see [41], [42], [46], [47], [48].
For example, the single (i-th for i = 0, 63) SHA2-256 round in pseudocode:
IF i > 16:
S := Wi−15
R0 := (S≫ 7) XOR (S≫ 18) XOR (S  3)
S := Wi−2
R1 := (S≫ 17) XOR (S≫ 19) XOR (S  10)
Wj := Wi−16 ADDR0 ADDWi−7 ADDR1
ELSE:
Wi ← LEBE
(
CHUNK[32i, 32i+ 1, ..., 32i+ 31]
)
S1 := (E≫ 6) XOR (E≫ 11) XOR (E≫ 25)
P := (E AND F ) OR (NOT(E) ANDG)
T1 := H ADD S1 ADD P ADDKi ADDWi
S0 := (A≫ 2) XOR (A≫ 13) XOR (A≫ 22)
M := (A ANDB) XOR (A AND C) XOR (B AND C)
T2 := S0 ADDM
H, G, F, E, D, C, B, A := G, F, E, D ADD T1, C, B, A, T1 ADD T2
There are modifications that doesn’t change the result for binbits, but make it different for
fuzbits, e.g. P := (E AND F ) XOR (NOT(E) ANDG).
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To specify the number of rounds (defaults are 64 for MD5, 80 for SHA1, 64 for SHA2, and 24
for SHA3/Keccak), we add the second argument: SHA1(M , 4) is SHA1 with 4 rounds.
For the ASCII-encoded message M = “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.”
the hash SHA1(M , 2) is H = c30b13efe3eaa95cf28c25be8c25bf585c8dbeee in hexadecimal
bytes. The 6th bit of M (here the count starts from 1) is m6 = 0, the 32nd bit of H is h32 = 1. If
we change m6 to 1, then h32 is still 1. If we change m6 from 0 to 1 gradually, h32 is given on (a):
a (2 rounds) b (4 rounds) c (6 rounds)
On (b) we see h32 w.r.t. m6 for 4-round SHA1, and on (c) — for 6-round SHA1.
(c) reveals the flaw of our fuzzy ops on [0; 1]: if fuzbits are not binbits, then the result quickly
converges to 12 as the number of ops increases. For 20 rounds, which is only
1
5 of the full SHA1,
and float64 precision, m6 = 10
−12 already gives h32 = 0.5. In some sense, it corresponds with
“certainty” meaning of a fuzzy bit: when we combine uncertaint entities, the certainty diminishes.
In attempt to circumvent this flaw we can modify fuzzy ops as follows: the result r is trans-
formed smoothly so that r ∈ [0; 12 ) moves closer to 0 and r ∈ ( 12 ; 1] moves to 1. One of such
transformations is t(r) = 3r2−2r3. On the other hand, if used without other limitations, it makes
the result to change very slowly near 0 and 1, while near 12 the change is very rapid.
Being given binbit hashes, NN with the loss function based on such fuzzy hashes learns to
predict the messages whose fuzbits are close to binbits as well.
Circular fuzziness. Let M be the same message and the CHF be SHA3-256. When fuzbits
and ops are circular, — mi, hi ∈ (−1; 1], — we have the following dependency of h14 on m6:
2 rounds 3 rounds 4 rounds
indicating another potential flaw — an “excessive” non-linearity. Of course, from CHF design’s
point of view this is a merit, not a flaw.
1.3 Neural networks and training
We apply, in general, the traditional fully-connected perceptron: NN is the sequence of the
layers, each layer consists of the cells, the output of each cell is the function of the weighted sum
of the outputs of all cells from the previous layer:
sij = a(bij +
ni−1∑
k=1
wi,j,ksi−1,k)
We extend it with the so-called batch normalization ([11, 8.7.1], [14]) after each inner layer;
not only does it accelerate learning, but improves the final results, — the average number of
wrong hash bits becomes 1.5–2 times less. Occasionally, regularization techniques (dropout, weight
regularization etc.) may be added.
Perhaps more sophisticated (e.g. deeper) architectures will work better, perhaps not.
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The hyperparameters of such NN are the number of layers and the number of cells in each
layer. The size of the input layer is the size of the hash, the size of the output layer is the size of
the predicted message (so any NN of this kind predicts the messages of certain fixed length).
To implement this architecture, we use Keras framework ([40]) with TensorFlow backend ([45]).
The activation function for all layers except the output one is ELU: a(x) =
{
x, x > 0,
ex − 1, x 6 0.
The activation for the output layer is sigmoid a(x) = (1 + e−x)−1 ∈ (0; 1) or “hard sigmoid”
a(x) = min{max{0; 15x+ 12}; 1}, — for [0; 1]- and for (−1; 1]-fuzbits (using something like tanh(x)
or sin(x) for the latter, although seeming more convenient, practically prevents NN from learning).
Hard sigmoid usually accelerates learning, but with it NN may “stick” to non-optimal states.
The loss function is calculated as follows: let h() be the fuzzy CHF and H = h(M) for
the randomly generated message M . M is unknown to NN, and H is the input to NN. NN
predicts fuzzy message M ′, for which we obtain the fuzzy hash H ′ = h(M ′) and the single loss
L = L(H;H ′). If NN is trained by batches of size n (so there are n input hashes H1, ..., Hn), then
the total loss on the batch is 1n
n∑
i=1
L(Hi;H
′
i). L is ‖H −H ′‖1: L(H;H ′) =
k∑
j=1
|hj − h′j | (denoted
by L1) or it may be a binary crossentropy L(H;H
′) = − 1k
k∑
j=1
[
hj log h
′
j + (1 − hj) log(1 − h′j)
]
(denoted by BCE), which sometimes slightly improves the accuracy of inversion.
The optimizer is Nadam (Nesterov Adam) with default learning rate 0.002, it can be replaced
by Adam or RMSprop with no significant impact on the results; see [11, 8.5], [18].
2 Results
are given in Addendum. Each of them consists of 6 items:
1. CHF, number of rounds, message length, and the mask — the bits of hash that contribute
to the loss and miss count (regardless of the mask, input to NN is always a full hash).
2. Hyperparameters of NN (cells in each layer) and training parameters per epoch (train
samples and batch size).
3. Training chart: X is epoch, Y is loss.
When the training finishes, we proceed to the testing phase. We randomly generate 1024 binbit
messages, calculate the CHF for them and let the trained NN predict the messages with the same
hashes. Then we bitwisely round predicted messages so that fuzbits become binbits, calculate their
usual hashes and for each pair (true hash; hash of rounded predicted message) count the number
of misses — different binbits of hashes. After that we generate another 1024 random messages,
calculate their hashes and compare with the true ones to count misses; this shows the advantage
of the trained NN over “zero level” of randomly guessing the message with a given hash.
4. Histograms of total number of misses: X is number of misses, Y is number of hashes with
so many misses, for predicted and for random messages.
5. Histogram of misses for hash bits of predicted messages: X is the index of bit, Y is the
frequency of miss at this bit.
6. Average, minumum, and maximum number of misses, for predicted and random messages.
Only the ranges with non-zero values are shown.
In this scheme, instead of training NN on the actual values of certain CHF for the messages,
we can input random bit strings, including the hashes that are “impossible” (e.g. 1-round SHA1
produces the hash with majority of its bits being constant). As with many other choices, it makes
almost no difference: the speed of learning is the same, and although the final loss is greater due
to “unreachable” wrong hash bits, in the end NN inverts test hashes equally well/not well.
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We present “general inversion” results (see Introduction), because we have found that in av-
erage they are usually close to “single inversion” ones. When the task is to invert a specific hash,
it is certainly more preferable to train many NNs, each given this hash, and collect “the best”
preimages with minimal number of hash bit misses.
In most cases, the loss function at the end of the training has apparently come close to an
asymptotic value, but sometimes the training was interrupted before that, and the loss had not
yet reached its minimum.
The results are stable: if we run NN training with the same hyperparameters, for the same
number of epochs etc., the final loss and the accuracy for the test hashes will be nearly identical.
Conclusion and further development
Obviously, as the number of rounds increases, all four CHFs quickly become too complicated for
NNs of considered architectures to invert, or, in other terms, to approximate the inverse function.
SHA1: NN is able to invert 1 round with positive probability, for 2 rounds there are at least
10 misses, then the number of misses becomes greater than the number of matched bits. The
full hash for more than 5–6 rounds with the accordingly long messages is almost uninvertible; the
quick-convergence-to- 12 flaw of (unadjusted) fuzzy ops contributes to this barrier. Partial matching
of a small group of hash bits is possible.
MD5: slightly harder than SHA1, but closer to it than to SHA2 from NN-inversion difficulty’s
point of view.
SHA2: similar to SHA1, harder.
SHA3/Keccak: Inversion of 1 round for short (what’s short depends on rate and capacity)
messages is good, can be exact; of 2 and more is very bad. Weakened rounds move the “barrier”
further. Learning may delay for few initial epochs. A small group of hash bits can be matched
partially.
Even for relatively small number of rounds this approach in its presented form is much weaker
than e.g. those from [10], [23], [24]. One of its most important shortcomings is that there is no
guarantee to obtain the exact preimage, however much time NN has spent on training. Another
drawback is the fixed length of the preimage returned by given NN, though it’s possible to train
many NNs for different message lengths.
On the other hand, a tiny but statistically significant increase of accuracy in hash bits for NN-
predicted messages over that for randomly guessed messages indicates the possibility to “trace
back” the hash bits to the message ones, which can be exploited.
Few directions of further development, in no particular order, and not without assumption
that something has been done already, somewhere:
• Tune fuzzy ops and NN for this problem by defining ops, selecting activations, loss func-
tion, optimizer and its parameters etc. more carefully. Few times throughout this paper we’ve
mentioned some alternatives and that switching between them doesn’t improve the final accuracy;
however, there may be much better ones that slipped past our attention. Objection: this is a
common “belief” when dealing with NNs, but maybe it can be proven that NNs will always have
a lower positive bound of the accuracy.
• If the value of m-round CHF provides its full internal state, then we can use NN inversion
iteratively to restore the state before the m-th round, then before the (m− 1)-th one, and so on.
Objection: multiple rounds may depend on the one and the same part of the input message, like
SHA1 after the first 16 rounds; also, the hash may come from a truncated state (SHA3/Keccak).
• Modify NN architecture, add connections between non-adjacent layers, convolutions, recur-
rency, add combinators/solvers that produce fuzzy bits within NN and are controlled by outputs
of the cells, and so on. Objection: see 1st item.
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• Combine NN with other known preimage-searching methods, like SAT solvers. Objection:
NNs may not provide any advantage over those, wherever into the “chain” NNs are inserted (if
so, it would be useful to prove the statements about the absence of such advantage). Since SAT
solvers actually apply machine learning approaches, this one is probably implemented by now.
• Train the ensembles of NNs, then combine their outputs. Objection: if NNs predict different
messages with partial hash matching, there is no “averaging” to increase the accuracy.
• Train NN to predict the message for which not only the final hash matches the input one,
but some bits of intermediate states match the respective bits of such states at the calculation of
the true hash. Objection: different states transform to the same hash.
• Generate training samples from the messages that satisfy some constraints, maybe changing
these constraints with time, so that NN learns to invert the dependence of CHF on different parts
of the message gradually. Objection: NN may not converge, it will learn at first to predict the
beginning and not the end, then to predict the end and not the beginning, then again etc.
• Apply different fuzzy ops for different bits of the state, make them depend on the index of
the round etc., to distinguish previous states leading to the same current state. Objection: inverse
function may become more complex, not simpler.
• Make input hashes and messages they’re obtained from more fuzzy, so that their bits aren’t
only 0/1. Objection: tried on NNs described here, it does not improve training or its results.
• Abandon this approach completely and do not waste time on it. . .
• ???
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Addendum
Before actual results for CHFs, we show that a single ADD op as we defined it already presents
certain difficulty to NN.
0“CHF”: ADD. The input to NN is 32-bit string, and NN learns to predict such 64-bit
string that the sum of its two 32-bit halves is the input. Mask: full, all “hash” bits.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 1024 samples divided into batches of 64 samples.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses for 1024 predicted messages: Average = 0.528, Min = 0, Max = 2.
Misses for 1024 random messages: Average = 15.944, Min = 6, Max = 25.
When NN finds two summands with exactly the given sum in only half of all tests, its ability to
invert much more sophisticated CHFs, designed specially to “cover footprints”, seems questionable.
The histogram of miss frequencies is typical in that it has some bits with “insurmountable”
uncertainty for NN, despite of 100% accuracy for the rest of the bits.
2.1 SHA1
This CHF along with MD5 and SHA2 follows Merkle-Damg˚ard construction ([16, 5.2]) and
uses ADD op, which appears to be the most difficult for our NNs to invert.
1CHF: SHA1, 1 round, message length is 32 bits (1st round doesn’t reach farther).
Mask: full, all hash bits.
NN: 1024 cells in 1 layer. 1024 samples divided into batches of 64 samples.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
12
Misses for 1024 predicted messages: Average = 2.866, Min = 0, Max = 7.
Misses for 1024 random messages: Average = 16.061, Min = 8, Max = 25.
This NN predicts messages such that certain bits of 1-round SHA1 are always right. The
frequencies of miss for the rest of the bits look like they’re close to something divisible by 18 or
1
4 .
Increasing the number of layers (towards “deep” learning) and cells per layer does not improve
these results much, same if we cut input to only the first 32 bits of hash that can change after
1st round. Another training of the 4-layer NN ends with similar characteristics and distributions,
including miss frequencies per bit:
Miss frequencies per bit (2)
For a comparison we once provide these frequencies for randomly generated messages:
Miss frequencies per bit for Random
2As we turn to 2-round SHA1, the accuracy expectably deteriorates.
CHF: SHA1, 2 rounds, 64-bit message.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 13.003, Min = 4, Max = 24.
Misses, random: Average = 31.936, Min = 18, Max = 48.
The first 32 bits of hash have become more “non-linear”, only few of them have “found the
way back to message” in some sense. The second half resembles the previous case.
Adding push-from- 12 transformation to XOR op, — that is, aXOR
′b = 3r2−2r3, where r = aXORb,
— slightly speeds up NN learning. However, if we push ADD in a similar way, the learning worsens.
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CHF: SHA1, 2 rounds, 32-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 6.706, Min = 0, Max = 19.
Misses, random: Average = 31.908, Min = 14, Max = 47.
Evidently, the inversion is simpler for shorter messages.
45 rounds (every hash bit is able to change) are enough to make the limitations clear.
CHF: SHA1, 5 rounds, 160-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 4 layers, 512 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 64.787, Min = 45, Max = 80.
Misses, random: Mean = 79.980, Min = 60, Max = 100.
First 96 bits (3 double words out of 5) of the hash are too random-like for NN, it cannot
produce the message to match them.
5As before, it’s easier for shorter messages.
CHF: SHA1, 5 rounds, 32-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
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Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 32.622, Min = 0, Max = 69.
Misses, random: Average = 80.177, Min = 50, Max = 103.
Remarkably, NN exactly inverted 60 hashes out of 1024, which is at least 1.5 times more than
for any other single number of misses.
7–8 rounds for the messages longer than 160 bits are impassable: the average number of misses
is 80 or so, same as if NN were guessing the messages randomly.
6Next result shows that ADD op is the main obstacle for NN. Here we deal with weakened
SHA1 rounds, where all ADDs are replaced by XORs, which reduces the diffusion greatly.
CHF: SHA1 with ADD replaced by XOR, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
(All miss frequencies are 0, there were no wrong bits.)
Misses, predicted: Average = Min = Max = 0.0.
Misses, random: Average = 31.97, Min = 18, Max = 45.
NN has learnt to invert the hash with 100% accuracy; compare it with Res. 2.
Also, the difficulty depends on the constants Hi and Ki from the SHA1 rounds. When we set
the majority of their bits to 0, or made their bit structure more regular (like 0x13131313), the
accuracy of inversion increased (with ADD op).
7When it’s too hard to match full hash, NN may be able to match a small group of bits.
CHF: SHA1, 3 rounds, 96-bit message. Mask: bits 0–7.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 2048 samples, 128 in batch.
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Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 1.813, Min = 0, Max = 4.
Misses, random: Average = 4.019, Min = 0, Max = 8.
8Now we try to invert the state transformation during 1st round. The input is 160 bits
(five 32-bit words) of the state after 1st round, NN should predict 160 bits of the state +
32-bit message word before 1st round; also, there is no addition of initial constant values.
CHF: SHA1, 1st round state transformation, 160+32-bit state+message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 16.232, Min = 8, Max = 24.
Misses, random: Average = 80.337, Min = 55, Max = 100.
First 32-bit word of the state, which is where the most changes happen, is too random for NN
to match.
9However, for at least one byte of the state the partial inversion is possible.
CHF: SHA1, 1st round state transform, 160+32-bit state+message. Mask: bits 0–7.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 2048 samples, 128 in batch.
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Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 0.999, Min = 0, Max = 7.
Misses, random: Average = 4.0498, Min = 0, Max = 8.
2.2 MD5
10Surprisingly, the 1st round of MD5 is tougher for NN than that of SHA1.
CHF: MD5, 1 round, 32-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 1024 cells in 1 layer. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 5.494, Min = 1, Max = 10.
Misses, random: Average = 15.972, Min = 6 , Max = 24.
11CHF: MD5, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 1024 cells in 2 layers. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
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Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 17.464, Min = 8, Max = 27.
Misses, random: Average = 32.174, Min = 21, Max = 44.
12CHF: MD5, 4 rounds, 128-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 1024 cells in 2 layers. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 53.084, Min = 35, Max = 70.
Misses, random: Average = 63.902, Min = 46, Max = 80.
2.3 SHA2
13CHF: SHA2-256, 1 round, 32-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 6.082, Min = 0, Max = 21.
Misses, random: Average = 31.994, Min = 16, Max = 46.
Note that the number of misses is more probably even than odd.
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14CHF: SHA2-256, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 40.827, Min = 22, Max = 63.
Misses, random: Average = 64.095, Min = 46, Max = 81.
15CHF: SHA2-256, 4 rounds, 128-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 4 layers, 512 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 110.042, Min = 86, Max = 133.
Misses, random: Average = 128.085, Min = 105, Max = 151.
2.4 SHA3/Keccak
There is no ADD op in this CHF, only NOT, AND, XOR. It is based on a sponge construction ([4]).
The state size is 1600 bits, by default the hash size is 256 bits (note that Keccak’s authors
at [39] mention, regarding preimage and collision solutions, that “smaller versions are harder to
break . . . they offer much less degrees of freedom”).
[0; 1]-fuzbits and (−1; 1]-fuzbits produce the results on a par with each other, so we present
only the latter-based trainings.
16When the message is short enough, the inversion of a single (1st) round looks promising.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 1 round, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
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NN: 256 cells in 1 layer. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Misses, predicted: Average = Min = Max = 0.
Misses, random: Average = 120.122, Min = 67, Max = 168.
For the similar NN, same message length, and 1 round of Keccak-1600-512 the results of
prediction are identical (no wrong bits for 1024 test hashes), the misses for random messages have
Average = 186.04, Min = 128, Max = 232.
17However, the messages longer than 64-bit lane (see [42, 2.1, 3.1.1]) reveal the obstacle.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 1 round, 96-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 43.818, Min = 20, Max = 73.
Misses, random: Average = 119.848, Min = 81, Max = 152.
Some hash bits almost always match, others seem random or constant, thus match with proba-
bility 12 , and there’s the third group, which is “between”. This foreshadows the problem increasing
rapidly as the number of rounds grow, for the uncertainty will “propagate” to other bits.
18That obstacle in the form of lower accuracy bound depends not only on message length,
but on rate and capacity of Keccak transformation too.
CHF: Keccak-1600-128, 1 round, 256-bit message (4 lanes). Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
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Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 14.361328125, Min = 2, Max = 23.
Misses, random: Average = 64.0712890625, Min = 46, Max = 87.
Notice that the increasing of accuracy accelerates after 7 or so initial epochs, in contrast to
the behaviour that we’ve observed till now.
If the output activation is “hard” sigmoid instead of usual one, the learning will slow down.
19One round more, and we lose everything with these NN and training set.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 127.614, Min = 105, Max = 156.
Misses, random: Average = 128.23, Min = 99, Max = 152.
20Once again smaller hash size (hence capacity) and bigger training set help a little.
CHF: Keccak-1600-128, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 8192 samples, 512 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
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Misses, predicted: Average = 56.981, Min = 43, Max = 76.
Misses, random: Average = 63.967, Min = 42, Max = 87.
To get this “achievement”, the total number of train samples, as well as the batch, were made
8 times bigger.
21Even a single byte of the hash is difficult for NN to match.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 2 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: bits 0–7.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 4096 samples, 256 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 1.006, Min = 0, Max = 6.
Misses, random: Average = 3.946, Min = 0, Max = 8.
The number of train samples, the batch, and the number of epochs were doubled.
Similarly to Res. 18 and 20, NN initially delays before it starts to seemingly increase the
accuracy: up to 8–9th epoch there are no signs of the forthcoming “success”. This behaviour is
known to raise expectations, — maybe we should “wait a little longer and see how NN makes it”,
though the asymptote of accuracy is still positive. In other words, we would like to be sure that
NN from Res. 19 doesn’t just need more time.
When the mask is 0–31 bits (first double word of the hash), this NN after 64 epochs is able to
match 20 bits of the hash in average, while for random messages it’s 16 bits, and the loss remains
quite close to 16 for the first 12–13 epochs.
22As usual, short messages are much easier.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 2 rounds, 16-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
22
Misses, predicted: Average = 1.401, Min = 0, Max = 65.
Misses, random: Average = 122.68, Min = 71, Max = 149.
997 hashes of 1024 were exactly inverted. This may look like overfitting, for there are only
216 = 65536 such messages, though our training could contain at most half of them.
It is surely much faster and simpler to verify all 216 messages for a given hash.
23The limits of “easiness” are quite narrow: only 8 additional bits almost nullify it.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256, 2 rounds, 24-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 122.957, Min = 86, Max = 151.
Misses, random: Average = 128.462, Min = 102, Max = 154.
Further training might increase the accuracy a little; for now only 2 bits of the hash have better
match than random guess.
24Now we consider Keccak with weakened rounds, removing some of θ, ρ and pi, χ, ι
mappings (see [42, 3.2]) from each round. First of all, we remove θ since it is the main
source of diffusion of the whole transformation ([5, 2.3.2]).
CHF: Keccak-1600-256 without θ, 6 rounds, 128-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 119.131, Min = 93, Max = 151.
Misses, random: Average = 127.446, Min = 99, Max = 157.
23
Not much, but NN is able to learn, and there’s a “potential” for subsequent improvement (the
accuracy will increase).
25Again, the hashes of short messages can be inverted exactly.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256 without θ, 6 rounds, 48-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 12.499, Min = 0, Max = 42.
Misses, random: Average = 117.321, Min = 82, Max = 145.
26On the other hand, θ alone is not everything...
CHF: Keccak-1600-256 with only θ, 2 rounds, 128-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 102.848, Min = 70, Max = 133.
Misses, random: Average = 127.918, Min = 89, Max = 157.
...on yet another hand, θ is probably the principal obstacle, because 3-round version with only
θ seemed to be uninvertible by our NNs even for 32-bit messages.
27Leaving just χ — the only non-linear mapping ([5, 2.3.1]) — produces a “split”.
CHF: Keccak-1600-256 with only χ, 6 rounds, 64-bit message. Mask: full.
NN: 2 layers, 1024 cells each. 1024 samples, 64 in batch.
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Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 1.652, Min = 0, Max = 6.
Misses, random: Average = 64.468, Min = 39, Max = 88.
There are 6 bits, 2 in each of 3 groups, about which NN is “uncertain” and therefore exactly
inverts only half of the test hashes.
28Finally, the attempt to invert two bytes of 1-round Keccak-f [200] permutation of the
200-bit state (NN gets the state after the permutation and tries to restore the state before
it, absorbing and squeezing phases are omitted); see [4, 2.4], [5, 1.2].
CHF: Keccak-200 state permutation, 1 round, 200-bit message=state. Mask: bits 0–15.
NN: 3 layers, 512 cells each. 4096 samples, 256 in batch.
Loss (L1) Misses for Predicted Misses for Random
Miss frequencies per bit
Misses, predicted: Average = 2.053, Min = 0, Max = 9.
Misses, random: Average = 8.063, Min = 2, Max = 14.
There’s the familiar initial delay of the learning, and for wider masks the difficulty increases;
in particular, when the mask is full (0–199), the results of this NN’s training look like Res. 19.
The mask bits can be non-adjacent: for the mask {17 + 11i | i = 0, 15} the average number of
misses after 128 epochs was ≈ 1.3, and 164 times out of 1024 all 16 bits coincided.
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Ancillary files
The ancillary files to this paper contain the Python implementation of the fuzbit-string CHFs
calculation, NumPy- and backend-based, and the NN training to invert few rounds of these CHFs,
so that the results presented here can be reproduced, verified, and extended easily if needed.
FILE SIZE SHA2-256 SHA3-256
bytehash.py 13014 b68d 3d60 1da4 54b7
a4e9 aaea 39b2 1720
7e45 ed90 b1b5 1177
ee60 4a88 3bef aa25
47a2 76dd 722c bde5
4d95 e7de 49c3 57c2
7594 b27b 0655 1780
3c5c f55f 3be2 67cf
fuzzybitsconv.py 1085 4ad1 b87f 3bb3 1c07
04f3 f2ab 1dcc 06ce
8b9c f834 3204 b33d
33fd 990f 2295 91b4
e99f dff2 d00f 8196
8d1d f6ef 7824 f5bc
ca15 a72f 20d3 ecd3
3db7 8ef3 0d88 f066
fuzzyops numpy.py 2436 f20c 98a6 3779 3d18
343a ed40 4cae d16b
e9f7 0098 d555 26c2
168e 9c4c 92a9 c2fa
d3e6 c403 43d4 65d7
c6c2 9bdb 86e0 44db
ca5b 84f8 8afa 280a
fd21 4288 bf53 f8d5
fuzzyops backend.py 2484 b902 25d0 ea38 6954
85fe aa8d 292b 7e7a
2902 2742 dde0 70ad
0490 f55c 773d e623
b97a 8403 3e5e 2f20
528b 2381 9582 f010
78ef 0cf9 f2a2 642d
8a23 73d9 940e 1614
fuzzyops circ numpy.py 993 9e31 1a28 bda4 ab6c
9510 c823 1d46 ab5f
cc0d 7377 4ee6 2d02
01d9 f6a3 63ac 3632
096f 99c4 9650 a336
8092 a517 cae5 1924
1732 15ef 272d 422c
c509 07f8 0740 3b9e
fuzzyops circ backend.py 1156 c556 d418 f693 c13a
4fe9 cd6b e844 5bd2
4ccc 174c c959 e073
829f 7a80 72f6 dc21
0422 c066 5be0 a3d3
c701 641e 76e7 3c79
8ced 3f1b c4ed eafa
7174 0186 eba0 1c8c
fuzzyhash numpy.py 14645 3f6a b4be 17e2 84af
3bdd 8f43 518f 40a8
74d1 4aec 1fab 2ff0
779c c79e 77d2 c549
f1be f28c f4af 9ee3
16bf db38 cd90 4a98
148c c761 bbb7 750f
12f4 15dc 91fb b4c2
fuzzyhash backend.py 15372 84b9 da7b c5b3 e0c1
f690 1efb 6c2b 1eae
9cb6 456b 9d35 d327
17d0 5b13 c616 3982
fc7c 1f12 6e95 ac6a
427c 880d 5a3e 838d
ebb0 cf53 e514 b514
571f 00b9 2ef3 20c2
learnfuzzyhashinversion.py 10758 b049 fb12 56b1 9bd2
0730 d261 497a d587
d1ae 2f6e be7d 7140
e01a 16db 07f0 c9c0
ee6b f77e 420a 7580
2491 6eaf fcdf ca5b
4e65 0fbd b552 8ee6
1628 9eeb 2434 4275
readme.txt 1419 d727 9406 b436 1eb1
8baf f843 5649 c928
c715 4573 c2c6 052e
5900 d30c eec1 0efc
07d5 a664 8f71 c5bd
953e 9ebe 445f 7b04
52b6 6c1c feeb 6816
2132 9491 ee6c c84a
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